This American Life: NUMMI
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This American Life: NUMMI
If you don't already listen to this show, its probably the best radio program on the air right now. The last episode is all about NUMMI, GM, Toyota, and what might have been. Great show to listen to,
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-arch...isode/403/nummi
PROLOGUE.
Host Ira Glass introduces the story of the New United Motor Manufacturing Inc., aka NUMMI. In 1984, General Motors and Toyota opened NUMMI as a joint venture. Toyota showed GM the secrets of its production system: how it made cars of much higher quality and much lower cost than GM achieved. But today, GM cars still don't have the quality of Japanese imports, GM is bankrupt and on March 31, NUMMI will be closed, sending thousands of car workers looking for jobs. In this hour-long story, NPR Automotive Correspondent Frank Langfitt tells the story of NUMMI and why GM – and the rest of the American car business – wasn't able to learn from it more quickly. (4 1/2 minutes)
Act One.
The rise of NUMMI, or how one of the worst auto plants in America started producing some of its best cars, thanks to lessons learned from the Toyota production system. (25 1/2 minutes)
Act Two.
Why did it take so many years for GM to begin implementing the lessons of NUMMI across the company? NPR Automotive Correspondent Frank Langfitt continues his story. (26 minutes)
This episode contains interviews with the following individuals: David Champion, Jeffrey Liker, John Shook, Bruce Lee and Joel Smith of United Auto Workers / UAW, Rick Madrid, Billy Haggerty, Richard Aguilar, Earl Ferguson, Ernie Schaefer, Mark Hogan, Steve Bera, Larry Spiegel, Dick Fuller, Geoff Weller and James Womack.
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-arch...isode/403/nummi
PROLOGUE.
Host Ira Glass introduces the story of the New United Motor Manufacturing Inc., aka NUMMI. In 1984, General Motors and Toyota opened NUMMI as a joint venture. Toyota showed GM the secrets of its production system: how it made cars of much higher quality and much lower cost than GM achieved. But today, GM cars still don't have the quality of Japanese imports, GM is bankrupt and on March 31, NUMMI will be closed, sending thousands of car workers looking for jobs. In this hour-long story, NPR Automotive Correspondent Frank Langfitt tells the story of NUMMI and why GM – and the rest of the American car business – wasn't able to learn from it more quickly. (4 1/2 minutes)
Act One.
The rise of NUMMI, or how one of the worst auto plants in America started producing some of its best cars, thanks to lessons learned from the Toyota production system. (25 1/2 minutes)
Act Two.
Why did it take so many years for GM to begin implementing the lessons of NUMMI across the company? NPR Automotive Correspondent Frank Langfitt continues his story. (26 minutes)
This episode contains interviews with the following individuals: David Champion, Jeffrey Liker, John Shook, Bruce Lee and Joel Smith of United Auto Workers / UAW, Rick Madrid, Billy Haggerty, Richard Aguilar, Earl Ferguson, Ernie Schaefer, Mark Hogan, Steve Bera, Larry Spiegel, Dick Fuller, Geoff Weller and James Womack.
#4
I chuckled about the part where GM workers put the front end on the car and just kept throwing parts on. Come hell or high water nothing was gonna shut down that assembly line. Turns out it can, even if it did take 20+ years of building crap to do so.
Salt in the wound? The NUMMI plant may be torn down and the tax payers will pay to construct a new baseball diamond! Schweet!
Salt in the wound? The NUMMI plant may be torn down and the tax payers will pay to construct a new baseball diamond! Schweet!
#5
This was a great listen. ANYONE who wants a behind the scenes on why GM bombed should listen to this. While it doesn't mention this, I would assume Ford was having the same problems which is why they ALMOST tanked.
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I think it should be noted that the problems GM was having in the late 70s and early 80s were not identical to the issues in the 1990s and into this decade. The Big 3 still have union labor relation issues but what really killed them into the mid and later 1990s was high overhead costs. Due to legacy costs they couldn't put as much content into a car. When GM had to pay $2500 per car in legacy costs there was simply no way they could deliver the same quality (content wise) for the same cost as the competitors. In the end it was the high legacy costs which did GM in and almost killed Ford.
Incidentally, quoting CR is a bit questionable. CR has a sliding quality scale. It's like giving a test in school. If everyone studies had and everyone makes a 90% or better is it fair for the teacher to give half the students a C or below simply because everyone did well? CR built their reputation at a time when many cars would fall apart in less than 100,000 miles. These days that's just not true. The real difference between good and poor reliability is much smaller than many might assume. That doesn't mean that GM doesn't have work to do but it does mean that just because a car scores below average (as opposed to well below average) that is should be avoided. I strongly suspect CR changed from an absolute scale to the sliding scale because too many cars were doing well. CR loses their relevance if they acknowledge that 80% of the cars on the market today are likely going to do just fine when it comes to long term reliability.
Does anyone have a link to the second half of the article? I could only hear the first part. It was good but it basically concentrated on GM of the 1970s, not the GM of the 1990 and into this decade.
Incidentally, quoting CR is a bit questionable. CR has a sliding quality scale. It's like giving a test in school. If everyone studies had and everyone makes a 90% or better is it fair for the teacher to give half the students a C or below simply because everyone did well? CR built their reputation at a time when many cars would fall apart in less than 100,000 miles. These days that's just not true. The real difference between good and poor reliability is much smaller than many might assume. That doesn't mean that GM doesn't have work to do but it does mean that just because a car scores below average (as opposed to well below average) that is should be avoided. I strongly suspect CR changed from an absolute scale to the sliding scale because too many cars were doing well. CR loses their relevance if they acknowledge that 80% of the cars on the market today are likely going to do just fine when it comes to long term reliability.
Does anyone have a link to the second half of the article? I could only hear the first part. It was good but it basically concentrated on GM of the 1970s, not the GM of the 1990 and into this decade.
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Originally Posted by rockville,Mar 30 2010, 06:14 AM
Does anyone have a link to the second half of the article? I could only hear the first part. It was good but it basically concentrated on GM of the 1970s, not the GM of the 1990 and into this decade.
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Originally Posted by wraith5,Mar 30 2010, 09:41 AM
The 2nd part concentrates more on the 1990's. You can download the mp3 version from the same link. It has both parts.
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Having listened to the whole thing it was a good article. I liked that they both showed the failings of management but also the issues of labor and the union refusing to help.
I was a afraid this would be more like some of the other GM articles on NPR which have often been superficial or simply reporting a given conclusion. In the end this one was actually rather good.
I liked that the illustrated that GM did have people who knew what the hell was going on. I really appreciate that they said something that I and the other "GM supporters" have said for a while. In the last decade it was clear that GM really did get it and that they were making good cars. In the 1980s and to a lesser degree in the 1990s GM seemed to have a few good ideas that were wasted on bad cars. Even when they had a class leading subsystem the sum of the parts was greater than the whole. However, in this decade (01-10) they really seemed to have finally turned the corner. However the legacy costs, killed them in the end.
Thanks for sharing!
I was a afraid this would be more like some of the other GM articles on NPR which have often been superficial or simply reporting a given conclusion. In the end this one was actually rather good.
I liked that the illustrated that GM did have people who knew what the hell was going on. I really appreciate that they said something that I and the other "GM supporters" have said for a while. In the last decade it was clear that GM really did get it and that they were making good cars. In the 1980s and to a lesser degree in the 1990s GM seemed to have a few good ideas that were wasted on bad cars. Even when they had a class leading subsystem the sum of the parts was greater than the whole. However, in this decade (01-10) they really seemed to have finally turned the corner. However the legacy costs, killed them in the end.
Thanks for sharing!