The following alert is from APSA (Airline Pilots Security Alliance) www.secure-skies.org . it details how the TSA is keeping any and all information about threats to security FROM the pilots operating that flight, while screening the flight as if a clear threat exsists. Of particular interest is the secondary screening of flight crews which is nothing more than harrassment. If a pilot wishes to do harm, he/she doesn't need a weapon...they're flying it.

This should give you a nice warm feeling next time you go to the airport.



Security Alert
April 30, 2004

The Transportation Security Administration has identified United Airlines flight 200, from

Los Angeles to Washington-Dulles as a "flight of interest".

Passengers are being subjected to secondary screening at the boarding gate for this flight by a team of TSA employees. Passengers' bags are also being sniffed by bomb-sniffing dogs prior to being loaded in the baggage compartment and additional security measures are being applied. The TSA refuses to provide the reason for such overwhelming security applied to this flight to the flight crew responsible for the flight's safety.

Of greater concern is that all flight and cabin crewmembers are being directed to empty their personal belongings, pockets and bags for additional inspection. While passengers are being inspected at random, ALL flight crew are being subjected to additional wanding and rifling of their bags in front of their passengers. It is unclear what TSA's response will be if the crew simply declines the additional inspection.

Additionally, the pilot conducting the exterior preflight inspection is being "shadowed" by an average TSA screener as he inspects the aircraft. It is unclear if the screener is cleared for access to the ramp or has training in the myriad hazards associated with close aircraft operations on the ramp. It is also unclear if this is an attempt by the TSA to begin targeting flight crews for special screening in general, or if intelligence suggests terrorist imposters are trying to infiltrate legitimate flight crew. In either case, APSA considers TSA's action completely unacceptable.

It should be obvious that a weapon is superfluous to any pilot in gaining control of an airliner, since the pilot is granted such control by definition. Additionally, there exists a foolproof crewmember identification system to verify the flight and cabin crew members assigned to a flight. The system is undefeatable. Finally, it is absolutely impossible to spend even five minutes prior to flight with an "imposter" crewmember, since the imposter's complete lack of knowledge and familiarity with proper airline procedures, responses and protocols would be immediately obvious.

We are also very concerned that numerous Federal Aviation Regulations specifically require the Pilot In Command be provided all available information which may threaten the safety of the flight, in order to exercise his responsibility to ensure the passengers' and the flight's safety. Without information on the specific nature of a terrorist threat, it is virtually impossible for the pilot to make this assessment. TSA's refusal to provide the pilot in command with specific information concerning the nature of an obvious security concern may not only interfere with the pilot in command's role as the Inflight Security Coordinator, it may actually cause the pilot to violate federal law and to subject the air carrier to essentially boundless civil liability should the pilot elect to conduct the flight, especially should something go wrong. The air carrier, too, should evaluate whether the flight should be conducted.