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This book begins with Chapter 1 -In Mexico- and ends with Chapter 16-The Aftermath. It covers events leading up to the war, major battles leading to Gettysburg, and Lee's march into Pennsylvania after Chancellorsville. Fully half of the book is devoted to the events that took place at Gettysburg on Day 3, north and east of Cemetery Ridge.
I'll just give a short summary mentioning some of the points made in the book. Much of the space in the book is devoted to a discussion of the evidence and sources used in reaching a new perspective on the Battle of Gettysburg.
Carhart's major claim is that Robert E. Lee's plan for the battles of Day 2 and Day 3 followed established battle doctrine; and that despite his protest that it was his fault, the failure was not his, but was due to failures by his officers to carry out his orders and accomplish the key tasks they were assigned.. One of the most important failures was Stuart's failure to prevail over Gregg's Union cavalry, that was guarding the Union's right flank east of Culp's Hill, and attack Hancock from the back side of Cemetery Ridge. He was to aim at the same copse of trees that Pickett's Charge was directed toward on the west side of the ridge. As Longstreet's forces pierced the Union lines from the west, Stuart was to have brought his 6,000 man cavalry (5,000 + Jenkins' 1,000 cavalrymen) against the soft rear of the Union army, meeting up with the 13,000 Confederate infantrymen charging up across from Seminary Ridge on the other side.
Carhart goes into detail in explaining Stuart's activities on Day 3. He reached his destination at Cress Ridge north and east of Gettysburg early on July 3, surveyed the area and signalled to Lee by four cannon shots that he was ready with no obstacles to attack the Union's back side. Lee was now free to go forward with his three-pronged plan. Stuart's signal for launching the movement of his troops down across Hanover Road to Bonaughton Road, and then north on Baltimore Pike to the unprotected side of Cemetary Hill and Culp's Hill was the cessation of Artillery fire from Seminary Ridge, marking the beginning of Pickett's Charge. From that moment he would have about 20 minutes to reach the Union lines in order to coordinate his attack with Pickett's Charge and Johnson's assault of Culp's Hill.
But Stuart did not make it to his destination on the high ground. Standing in the way of Stuart's 6,000 man cavalry was George Custer with his 1,800 man Union cavalry. Custer was a young officer who had been promoted early over more senior officers by General Pleasanton when General Meade took command of the army of the Potomac. He was young and ambitious and full of piss and vinegar. On July 3, Custer was to clash with Stuart's horsemen on the plain later to be called East Cavalry Field, and through careful maneuvering and exceptional bravery he succeeded in preventing a breakthrough that would have allowed Stuart to participate in the attack on the Union lines. Custer's 'first' stand actually saved the Union from defeat on Day 3 and robbed Lee of the victory he fully expected.
.....But Stuart did not make it to his destination on the high ground. Standing in the way of Stuart's 6,000 man cavalry was George Custer with his 1,800 man Union cavalry. Custer was a young officer who had been promoted early over more senior officers by General Pleasanton when General Meade took command of the army of the Potomac. He was young and ambitious and full of piss and vinegar. On July 3, Custer was to clash with Stuart's horsemen on the plain later to be called East Cavalry Field, and through careful maneuvering and exceptional bravery he succeeded in preventing a breakthrough that would have allowed Stuart to participate in the attack on the Union lines. Custer's 'first' stand actually saved the Union from defeat on Day 3 and robbed Lee of the victory he fully expected.....
Fascinating background info, Jim If Bill and you refer to the GNP brochure sent to you via snail mail, you'll see the East Cavalry Battlefield Site shown on the right side of the map. There's a brief note at the end of the 'numbered' sites on the AutoTour text.
It's almost walking distance from our HQ hotel and certainly worth a visit...perhaps on Sunday for those 'staying over'. I've never been to that part of the park and look forward to seeing it....never realized how significant it was...
Gregg told Custer to deploy in the field at the northwest! corner of the intersection of Old Dutch Road and Hanover Road. Custer reached the intersection by mid-morning at the latest. He set his men up in a formation that extended in a U shape blocking Stuart's path. Custer's cavalry was armed with Spencer repeating rifles that could fire seven rounds consecutively. Some of the regiments still had single shot rifles, but all of his men carried sabers and Colt .45 revolvers. The brigade was then joined by the 1st New Jersey and part of the 3rd Pennsylvania from McIntosh (Gregg's division). The total number of Union soldiers on East Cavalry Field that day was probably about 2,700.
The Confederate force commanded by J.E.B. Stuart, consisted of the brigades of Jenkins, Chamblis, Hampton and Fitz Lee; about 6,000 horsemen.
About noon, General Gregg received a message from XI Corps, warning him that a large body of Confederate cavalry, perhaps thousands of horsemen, had earlier moved out the York Pike and looked like it was trying to get around the Union line.
Custer's advance scouts were then able to observe a Confederate skirmish line developing several hundred yards to the north. Then sometime after noon, fighting broke out between Stuart's force and the Union soldiers who were blocking him. The discovery of an unknown force of Yankee cavalry caused a problem for Stuart. He had already signaled to Lee that he was safely on Cress Ridge with all his men, the way was clear, he had not run into any Union troops, and that the valley below seemed empty, thus enabling him to get to Bonaughton Road without any hindrance.
What was he to do? He was confident he could blow through what looked like no more that a single large Union brigade; but that would take time, and timing was crucial. Stuart first ordered the Thirty-fourth Virginia to attack, but the men in blue held their ground. Stuart's artillery was brought out to shell Custer's position a mile away. So Custer turned to Pennington, whose artillery fire was stunning in its accuracy, taking out some of Stuart's artillery pieces and their crew members. A number of skirmishes by both sides ensued. Finally Stuart attempted to drive the Yankees off with a combination of mounted and dismounted attacks, but again to no avail. The Yankees held. Custer knew that the bottom of East Cavalry field gave ready access to the only open door into the Union rear . He was there to refuse it.
By about three in the afternoon Stuart was running out of time. Over on Seminary Ridge on the west side Lee had already ended the artillery barrage before launching Pickett's Charge. Stuart had to get to the Clump of Trees to facilitate a breakthrough and accomplish Lee's third prong of the battle. He only had twenty minutes, maybe thirty at the outside. He couldn't afford the time it would take to sweep the Union cavalry from his path in a confrontation that he otherwise knew he could win. He just needed to get through them and move on to Cemetery Ridge.
When Stuart assembled his force for a final attempt, he put Hampton's brigade at the front, then followed it with Fitz Lee's and ended it with part of Chamblis' brigade. The force of about 4,000 men formed up into a column (not a line) of squadrons and began to move south. The Union artillery was firing and hitting them, tearing great holes in their formation. (Civil War scholars have proposed that if Stuart had formed his men into squadron lines, instead of columns, he would have been able to sweep away any Union calvalry in his path, because he had enough men to form a line a half mile across and eight horsemen deep. And he would have had enough time.)
Finally, Custer rushed to the front of the 1st Michigan, drew his saber, and threw off his hat so they could see his yellow hair and shouted, "Come on Wolverines!". Then he led a charge into the Confederate column. When they got to within a few hundred yards of each other, Custer spread the front of his formation out to three times its original size and spurred forward into a gallop. As his men were galloping forward he ordered them to change from a c o l u m n of squadrons into a l i n e of squadrons. That meant that their front rank grew from fifteen to sixteen into three times that number, between forty and fifty. As Hampton's forces began to fan out to mimic the Yankees, their horses were turned sideways. The blue mass crashed into them, shooting and slashing as they careened down the column. The long line of squadrons behind Hampton necessarily stopped. But the horsemen at the back of the Confederate formation did not understand what had happened up front. Soon the column formation broke up into individual saber and pistol fights, -- and Stuart knew that he had been stopped.
But for Custer's seemingly suicidal frontal attack, Stuart might well have made it up the Baltimore Pike and into the Union rear, with unimaginable consequences. There was a lot of sword banging still to come, but eventually Stuart drew back up on Cress Ridge and the Yankees stayed on the plain below. Stuart had tried to get passed them and failed. By three-thirty Pickett's Charge had reached the Clump of Trees, but could not hold.
If Bill and you refer to the GNP brochure sent to you via snail mail, you'll see the East Cavalry Battlefield Site shown on the right side of the map. There's a brief note at the end of the 'numbered' sites on the AutoTour text. 
