Disdain by Union soldiers for southern "aristocracy."

 

This is a universal observation, but I think once you start to fighting it's pretty hard to stop. You go through school with somebody, enlist together, go through training together, march off together, and then one of you gets killed. The survivor doesn't need much more motivation now.

 

In the south there remains some element of distrust of the fast-talking and "arrogance" of those from the North.
As a quick aside: To this day my mother has little trust for my husband since he wasn't born in the south. When I took her to lunch to let her know of my engagement, she was horrified!! I quote, "A YANKEE!, your family will not feel comfortable with him," and "you have NO idea what his 'people' are like". My family connection has been very formal and more distant than I would like because of my choice (which I'm totally confident was the right choice for me). My mother has distinct memories of the tales of war that she learned from her grandfather who fought in the Civil War. These little tales will grow more and more blurred with time, but there are those in small rural areas who will adhere to their "truths". The south is more mired in tradition and is probably a bit more matriarchal than the north. Mama and grandma and so on are quite important and despite the "respect" paid to the males, mama really rules and sets the pace for the upbringing of the children and the leadership in the household. Oh, and lest I forget, I'll never forget my Uncle and Aunt who were primary caregivers when I was a child. I didn't know until I was almost school age that they were not really my aunt and uncle. They were an African-American couple who "helped" my grandmother and who were primarily responsible for my care when I was a child. As in many southern homes, we lived on the grounds of my grandparents and Uncle Ned and Aunt Sallie worked in my grandmother's home. I loved them more than I loved my own grandma and I grieved my heart out when they died. I can remember those halcyon days of my youth sitting on Aunt Sallie's lap and listening to her sing, Swing Low Sweet Chariot" and the happiest days of my life were spent picking blackberries with Uncle Ned.

 

This, to me, is the message of Chapter 4. Someone with better secondary information can probably confirm this for me, but if you look at the map on page 121 you will see the route led by Chamberlain's 20th Maine. It starts in Union Mills Maryland and leads to the hills outside of Gettysburg. By my rough guestimating, they marched well over 20 miles in one day, maybe closer to 30. This is the day after Lawrence is down with heat stroke. Remember, after the troops are told to fall out for the night, the orders come to resume the march and they march on through the night.

 

If Lee wanted Ewell to take the hill (at all costs?), his orders needed to be much more directive and specific. Lee left the decision to take the hill to Ewell. As it should be? I think so. Ewell and his commanders had to assess the fighting status of their own troops, assess enemy strength on the hill, artillery positions, etc. I think Ewell had a judgement call to make, and he made it.

Much more interesting, is whether or not Ewell would have succeeded in an attempt to take the hill. Here are some quotes from some of those that were there:

Hancock: "In my opinion, if the Confederates had continued the pursuit of General Howard on the afternoon of the 1st of July at Gettysburg, they would have driven him over and beyond Cemetery Hill."

Hunt (Federal artillery commander): "In fact an assault by the Confederates was not practicable before 5:30 p.m. and after that the position was perfectly secure. For the first time that day the Federals had the advantage of position, and sufficient troops and artillery to occupy it, and Ewell would not have been justified in attacking without the positive orders of Lee, who was present, and wisely abstained from giving them."

Alexander (Confederate artillery commander): "I think any attack we could have made that afternoon would have failed."

Rodes explained why he failed to attack in his battle report:
1) His troops were exhausted from the march, and somewhat disorganized as a result of the ferocity of the fighting
2) Ewell told him Lee did not want a general engagement brought on
3) By the time his line was in position to attack, there was a formidable line of Union artillery on the hill. "To have attacked this line with my division alone, diminished as it had been by a loss of 2500 men, would have been absurd."


After the war, Lee told his cousin "Ewell was a fine officer, but would never take the responsibility of exceeding his orders, and having been ordered to Gettysburg, he would not go farther and hold the heights beyond the town."

 

You are a mighty forgiving CO Vito. First it is ok for the commanders to engage the enemy when the CO has ordered NO engagement. Then it is ok to not even try to mount an attack when your CO says to attack if at all practicable. Hmmm. When we get to day two we will be discussing this concept in greater detail. It will be interesting to see how you judge the field commanders then.

 

My take on Lee's conduct as to his suggestive commands to Ewell as well as most of the other commanders at Gettysburg (discounting Longstreet):

These same sorts of suggestions had inspired Jackson to perform well above the call of duty and he had not yet learned that all of his generals would not respond in the same manner.

 

Correct!! As long as you make the right decision, and things go well, forgiveness for disobedience is a "given," particularly if there are justifiable reasons for the "disobedient" action.

With respect to Ewell, "attack if at all practicable" to me means, if you think your attack on the hill will fail, don't attack. If your forces are too exhausted, or if you have sustained too many casualties to mount an effective attack, don't attack.
To others, it means something else. The point being, the order is not "clear or decisive." The order opens itself up to interpretation. That's bad.
If Lee really wanted the hill, his orders would have been much more definitive. If Lee wanted the hill regardless of the losses, he should have relayed those important details to his field commanders. The facts are, he left the attack decision up to Ewell, and Ewell did not attack.

Someone made an interesting point earlier. Lee was being "let down" by his officers, many were in new positions, Stuart's failures, etc. With this being the case, should the orders not be more definitive, put the generals that work for you on a tighter leash? But how do you do that and still allow them some room for initiative? And how do you do this with field commanders separated by miles, and the limited communications available back then, riders/aides traveling by horseback?

 

Jackson and Lee, what a duo. No doubt Jackson would have attacked. Trimble wanted to attack. The troops wanted to attack. Must have been infuriating. Some subordinates do need more definitive direction than others.

But, was an attack against the hill the right decision? Would Ewell, or Jackson, have succeeded?

 

Remember that the Ewell and company was NOT yet sure how many troops were just beyond those hills. Some of the supposition here (woulda, coulda, shoulda....) is based on Monday Morning Q-backing.

IMHO, Lee was NOT sure what he wanted to do....thus his words were indecisive.