Hmmm. Well, from what we see in the book, the attack never comes, and Ewell doesn't bother to send one of those handy aides back to tell Lee he doesn't think a further attack is "practicable." Not attacking AND not responding. That tells me everything.

I don't think most of you boys would want to be a member of old LB's infantry. When I give an "if at all practicable" order, I expect either results or a report about how you tried and failed, or an immediate response that it is not possible. You don't leave me wondering what the heck you are doing. I only deal with paper and money. I can't believe the CO's expectations aren't as high as mine, or even higher. He is dealing with human life and the future of his country.

Also, there is a world of difference between mounting an attack and taking the hill at all costs. Ewell doesn't even bother to lean against the Union to see if they will move off.

 

Although the first day's battle is over, it will prove to be a long night before the sun rises on the second day. We will push on with Chapter 5 tomorrow. Continue with discussion of the first day and Chamberlain's march tonight.

 

Lee's battle report: "General Ewell was, therefore, instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army, which were ordered to hasten forward." (Johnson)

Shaara provides Taylor's recollection of the order in KA. Unfortunately, he leaves out the qualifier. He also leaves out the dialogue between Ewell's aides and Lee. There is an exchange. Ewell did direct his two commanders to prepare to make an assault, but Lee sends word there will be no support from Ewell's right. Ewell halts his troops to await for Johnson's arrival on the field. End of day 1.

Even if Lee's forces take the hill, so what? What was Meade's fallback plan? What is Lee after, the hill?

 

That is what I find (found) fascinating. His best, most trusted General, Longstreet, advises him against his plan of action, yet he believes he must attack. I agree, I think he is having a great deal of trouble deciding what to do.

 

Lee was a warrior. His troops had the blue-bellies running yet again. Lee had his own leadership style. He issued discretionary orders, as someone pointed out yesterday. His custom was to issue orders as suggestions, or directing them to be carried out "if practicable." This was his way of providing his field commanders with the latitude to comply with the command/orders or not. This worked well with Jackson and Longstreet, but many of his field commanders at Gettysburg are new to command, and are not used to his leadership style.

I have no doubt in my mind that R.E. Lee was focused on one thing, victory, and pressing the Union forces on Cemetery Hill prior to the end of day 1.

Even if they did take the hill that night, the Union plan for this contingency was to fall back to a defensive position between Lee's forces and Washington, on Pike Creek, between Manchester and Middleburg. It presented a strong, formidable defensive position. This was Meade's strategy. Hancock was sent to take command of the forces at Gettysburg, and to assess the position/situation. Hancock was to report to Meade whether to fight on the ground at Gettysburg, or to fall back to Pike Creek.

The order below was issued by Meade to Hancock, who was about 3 hours away from Gettysburg (at 1 p.m.):

Headquarters Army of the Potomac
July 1, 1863--1:10 p.m.

Major-General Hancock, Commanding Second Corps:

General: The major-general commanding (Meade) has just been informed that General Reynolds has been killed or badly wounded. He directs that you turn over the command of your corps to General Gibbon; that you proceed to the front, and, by virtue of this order, in case of the truth of General Reynolds' death, you assume command of the corps there assembled, viz, the Eleventh, First, and Third, at Emmitsburg. If you think the ground and position there a better one to fight a battle under existing circumstances, you will so advise the general, and he will order all the troops up. You know the general's views, and General Warren, who is fully aware of them, has gone out to see General Reynolds.
-------
Hancock objected. The other generals fighting ivo Gettysburg outranked him. Meade explains to Hancock that "at this crisis he must have a man he knew and could trust."

Hancock arrives at Cemetery Hill sometime around 4 p.m.

 

Day 1, Ch 5 Longstreet

Southern generals mentioned: Longstreet, Lee, Stuart, Jackson, Hill, Pickett, Garnett, and Armistead.

It is the end of Day 1, Longstreet surveys the bloody battlefield in a melancholy mood; knows that Lee will attack tomorrow, and that many men will die fighting uphill. He is falling into a deeper depression, thinking of his three children who had just died of the fever. Back at his command post he welcomes the attention given him by Fremantle. It is a distraction from his sadness.

Here the role of Fremantle is still to provide a running outside commentary on the developing story. From the Longstreet Fremantle conversation we learn more about Longstreet , Lee, and other southern officers, and specifically too, about further cultural and social differences between the Mother Country and the men of the two American camps. We also learn that Europeans think of the Americans generally as uncultured, 'behind the times', coarse, backwoodsy folks. But Fremantle is surprised by how cultured and gentlemanly Lee and other officers in the field are; Christians, Church of England. The whole army is Christian. Longstreet tells him that Jackson was a devout Christian, who knew how to hate. Took no prisoners; wanted them dead!.

[From KA and other sources, including Fremantle's own published comments back in England after the war, we know that he had reached the Confederacy by sailing to Cuba and then to Mexico. He crossed over the Rio Grande into Texas. There he observed life on the frontier, met Sam Houston in Galveston and may have noted that Texas was supplying the Confederacy by manufactoring and providing arms, food, and ammunitions, as well as importing supplies from Mexico through the Union blockade...]

Fremantle observes that Virginians are quite different from the Texans, or Mississippians.

Longstreet then explains his preference for a defensive strategy by exploring the southern soldiers' sense of honor -- that is often honor without intelligence. Anybody can die with honor, but the aim is to survive -- and win the war. This war is being fought in an outdated way. The weapons are more advanced and make possible a more rapid and accurate fire, so it is necessary to be more protective of life, more defensive in battle strategy. But he is talking into the darkness. Nobody listens. "Like all Englishmen, and most Southerners, Fremantle would rather lose the war than his dignity".

Longstreet idealizes Jackson as the best of the best. But Jackson was not a defensive general. He attacked -- and won his battles. Is this not a contradiction in Longstreet's thinking?

 

.....so Hancock barely had a chance to do anything on Day 1.

I don't recall that Buford and the other Union forces had very many men in place at the time of the engagement. At best, he knew that his cavalry troops could only effect a holding action.....and he did it very well.

Interestingly, Chamberlain arrived in Gettysburg late about 11 am on Day 2....resting his troops about 1 mile east of his as-yet-undetermined position on Little Round Top. [Sidebar: A shortcut at the beginning of our drive on Oct 7th will pass very close to this position, which was known as the Bucher peach orchard....located on the S end of the intersection of Granite Schoolhouse Road and Baltimore Pike] Ooops, getting a little bit ahead of the story....

 

Chapters 5, 6 and 7: Longstreet, Lee and Buford.

I'm discussing these three chapters together. They are short and complimentary. It is the evening of the first day.

Longstreet already knows Lee will attack. He is dark and brooding. The Union has the high ground. Longstreet can already see what will happen tomorrow. Although he is happy to encounter Freemantle on his ride back to his camp, his mood turns dark again when Freemantle simply cannot accept Longstreet's view of modern warfare. What does Longstreet conclude?

Lee meets with his field commanders and questions them. Without rehashing the past two days discussion, Shaara's report of the exchange supports the notion that Lee expected the attack, and Ewell knows he let Lee down. Early, one of Ewell's subordinates does most of the talking. Old Jubal, the prosecuting attorney is defending the decision (or lack thereof) of his superior. Lee feels deep disappointment and sees the face of Jackson. Next, see Lee's exchange with Trimble on pages 148-9. See also Lee's exchange with Ewell on page 150-151. It is clear that Ewell should have pressed on and taken the hill. It is clear that Ewell and Ewell's own staff know this. What do you think of how Lee handles the situation?

Buford returns to Cemetary Hill at the end of a long, bloody day of fighting. He is wounded, but chooses to hide the injury. He comes looking for provisions and orders. What does he get instead? How has Howard handled the Union commanders? What do you think of Hancock's handling of Buford? What about the condition of the Union command versus the condition of the Confederacy command?

Fire away!

 

Looking forward to the drive, Jerry.

--------------------------------------------------------
[[Quote: Legal Bill ^^
Buford returns to Cemetary Hill at the end of a long, bloody day of fighting. He is wounded, but chooses to hide the injury. He comes looking for provisions and orders. What does he get instead? How has Howard handled the Union commanders? What do you think of Hancock's handling of Buford? What about the condition of the Union command versus the condition of the Confederacy command?]]
---------------------------------------------------------
As Vito mentions above, Meade considers Hancock to be an officer that he can trust and depend on. Howard's troops run away again just as they did at Chancellorsville, where he was surprised and routed by Jackson. So Howard has been bypassed by Meade in appointing Hancock as commander, even though Howard is the superior officer. Howard makes a speech to the officers, but gets no respect. He is smarting from the break down and seizes on Buford as a convenient scapegoat. Buford reddens with anger.

Hancock has no idea of the stand that Buford made today together with Reynolds' corps. Hancock is very direct with Buford, and to the point. Just what Buford wanted -- not praise or recognition, just some orders and refitting for tomorrow. He slips away into the dark. He is a good soldier.

The Gettysburg confrontation was not foreseen or planned on by either side. But it is coming, ready or not. The Union headquarters is abuzz with activity. Meade arrives. He takes charge. Makes it known that the army will defend this ground tomorrow.

 

Earlier in this thread, Rob talked about his conclusions; that the book tells the tale of a tragedy with Lee as the tragic hero. Following on that thought, what do we see in chapter 6 that fits the classic formula of a tragedy?