The Killer Angels
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Originally Posted by ralper,Aug 30 2006, 08:20 PM
Was the Union blockade that effective? I had thought that the South wasn't going to get much in the way of help from Europe anyway.
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Research on invasion decision:
Lee explained that, in his opinion, the Confederacy had to choose between maintaining the line of the Mississippi and that of Virginia.2 If he could procure sufficient troops and could draw General Hooker away from the Rappahannock, he proposed to assume the offensive and to enter Pennsylvania. He believed that the best defensive for Richmond was at a distance from it; he did not think it desirable to fight again on the Rappahannock, where he could not follow up his victory. Neither did he wish once more to carry his army into the ravaged counties near Washington. A defeated foe could easily retire within the defenses of that city, as Pope had done. p19 Even had Lee been willing to give battle in Virginia, he did not think he could subsist his troops there,3 whereas, if he marched into Pennsylvania he would find provisions in abundance.4 By crossing high up the Potomac he could move into the rich Cumberland Valley, draw the enemy after him, clear Virginia of Federals, break up their plan of operations for the summer, and perhaps force the enemy to recall the forces that were troubling the south Atlantic coasts and threatening the railroads.5 Contact with the realities of war, moreover, might increase in the North the peace movement which seemed to be gathering strength.6 "It would be folly," he said subsequently, "to have divided my army; the armies of the enemy were too far apart for me to attempt to fall upon them in detail. I considered the problem in every possible phase, and to my mind, it resolved itself into a choice of one of two things
Lee explained that, in his opinion, the Confederacy had to choose between maintaining the line of the Mississippi and that of Virginia.2 If he could procure sufficient troops and could draw General Hooker away from the Rappahannock, he proposed to assume the offensive and to enter Pennsylvania. He believed that the best defensive for Richmond was at a distance from it; he did not think it desirable to fight again on the Rappahannock, where he could not follow up his victory. Neither did he wish once more to carry his army into the ravaged counties near Washington. A defeated foe could easily retire within the defenses of that city, as Pope had done. p19 Even had Lee been willing to give battle in Virginia, he did not think he could subsist his troops there,3 whereas, if he marched into Pennsylvania he would find provisions in abundance.4 By crossing high up the Potomac he could move into the rich Cumberland Valley, draw the enemy after him, clear Virginia of Federals, break up their plan of operations for the summer, and perhaps force the enemy to recall the forces that were troubling the south Atlantic coasts and threatening the railroads.5 Contact with the realities of war, moreover, might increase in the North the peace movement which seemed to be gathering strength.6 "It would be folly," he said subsequently, "to have divided my army; the armies of the enemy were too far apart for me to attempt to fall upon them in detail. I considered the problem in every possible phase, and to my mind, it resolved itself into a choice of one of two things
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Research on blockade effectiveness:
The Union blockade of the Confederacy was a powerful weapon that ruined the southern economy, at the cost of very few lives. The blockade not only stopped cotton exports, it choked off munitions imports as well. The measure of the blockade's success was not the few ships that slipped through, but the thousands that never tried it. Ordinary freighters stopped calling at southern ports. The interdiction of coastal traffic meant that long-distance travel depended on the rickety railroad system, which never overcame the devastating impact of the blockade. The blockade caused other hardships as well, especially the maldistribution of food. Throughout the war the South produced enough food for civilians and soldiers, but it had growing difficulty in moving surpluses to areas of scarcity and famine. Lee's army, at the end of the supply line, always went short. Occasional bread riots in Richmond and other cities showed that patriotism was not sufficient to satisfy the demands of housewives. Land routes remained open for cattle drovers, but after the Federals seized control of the Mississippi River in summer 1863, it became impossible to ship horses, cattle and swine from Texas and Arkansas to the eastern Confederacy. Never had a major seacoast been so completely shut down; never before had a navy solved the challenge of numbers, vigilance, discipline and replenishment. The blockade was a triumph of the US Navy, and a major factor in winning the war.
[edit]
Confederate response
The Confederacy constructed a number of torpedo boats, generally small, fast steam launches equipped with spar torpedoes, to attack the blockading fleet. Some torpedo boats were refitted steam launches, others, such as the David class, were purpose-built. The torpedo boats would attack under cover of night by ramming the spar torpedo into the hull of the blockading ship, then backing off and detonating the explosive. The torpedo boats were not very effective and were easily countered by simple measures such as hanging chains over the sides of ships to foul the screws of the torpedo boats, or encircling the ships with wooden booms to trap the torpedoes at a distance.
One historically notable naval action was the attack of the H. L. Hunley a submarine launched from Charleston, South Carolina against Union blockade ships. The Hunley made her first and only attack on the night of February 17, 1864, against the USS Housatonic. The Housatonic sank with the loss of 5 crew; the Hunley also sank, taking her crew of 9 to the bottom.
End of the Blockade
As the Union fleet grew in size, speed and sophistication, more and more ports came under Federal control. After 1862, only three ports--Wilmington, North Carolina; Charleston, South Carolina; and Mobile, Alabama--remained open for the 75 to 100 blockade runners in business. Charleston was shut down by Admiral John A. Dahlgren's South Atlantic Blockading Squadron in 1863. Mobile Bay was captured in August, 1864, by Admiral David Farragut (tied to the rigging of his flagship, he cried out, "Damn the torpedoes! Full steam ahead!"). Blockade runners faced an increasing risk of capture--in 1861 and 1862, one sortie in 9 ended in capture; in 1863 and 1864, one in 3. By war's end, imports had been choked to a trickle as the risk of capture soared to 50% per sortie. Some 1,100 blockade runners were captured (and another 300 destroyed) in the most effective blockade the world had ever seen. British investors frequently made the mistake of reinvesting their profits in the trade; when the war ended they were stuck with useless ships and rapidly depreciating cotton. In the final accounting, perhaps half the investors took a profit, and half a loss.
In December, 1864, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles sent a force against Fort Fisher, which protected the Confederate's access to the Atlantic from Wilmington, North Carolina, the last open Confederate port. [13]. The first attack failed, but with a change in tactics (and Union generals), the Fort fell in January, 1865, closing the last major Confederate port.
"The Union victory at Vicksburg in July of 1863 opened up the Mississippi River and effectively cut off the western Confederacy as a source of troops and supplies. The fall of Fort Fisher and the city of Wilmington, North Carolina early in 1865 closed the last major port for blockade runners, and in quick succession Richmond was evacuated, the Army of Northern Virginia disintegrated, and General Lee surrendered. Thus, most economists give the Union blockade a prominent role in the outcome of the war." (Elekund, 2004)
The Union blockade of the Confederacy was a powerful weapon that ruined the southern economy, at the cost of very few lives. The blockade not only stopped cotton exports, it choked off munitions imports as well. The measure of the blockade's success was not the few ships that slipped through, but the thousands that never tried it. Ordinary freighters stopped calling at southern ports. The interdiction of coastal traffic meant that long-distance travel depended on the rickety railroad system, which never overcame the devastating impact of the blockade. The blockade caused other hardships as well, especially the maldistribution of food. Throughout the war the South produced enough food for civilians and soldiers, but it had growing difficulty in moving surpluses to areas of scarcity and famine. Lee's army, at the end of the supply line, always went short. Occasional bread riots in Richmond and other cities showed that patriotism was not sufficient to satisfy the demands of housewives. Land routes remained open for cattle drovers, but after the Federals seized control of the Mississippi River in summer 1863, it became impossible to ship horses, cattle and swine from Texas and Arkansas to the eastern Confederacy. Never had a major seacoast been so completely shut down; never before had a navy solved the challenge of numbers, vigilance, discipline and replenishment. The blockade was a triumph of the US Navy, and a major factor in winning the war.
[edit]
Confederate response
The Confederacy constructed a number of torpedo boats, generally small, fast steam launches equipped with spar torpedoes, to attack the blockading fleet. Some torpedo boats were refitted steam launches, others, such as the David class, were purpose-built. The torpedo boats would attack under cover of night by ramming the spar torpedo into the hull of the blockading ship, then backing off and detonating the explosive. The torpedo boats were not very effective and were easily countered by simple measures such as hanging chains over the sides of ships to foul the screws of the torpedo boats, or encircling the ships with wooden booms to trap the torpedoes at a distance.
One historically notable naval action was the attack of the H. L. Hunley a submarine launched from Charleston, South Carolina against Union blockade ships. The Hunley made her first and only attack on the night of February 17, 1864, against the USS Housatonic. The Housatonic sank with the loss of 5 crew; the Hunley also sank, taking her crew of 9 to the bottom.
End of the Blockade
As the Union fleet grew in size, speed and sophistication, more and more ports came under Federal control. After 1862, only three ports--Wilmington, North Carolina; Charleston, South Carolina; and Mobile, Alabama--remained open for the 75 to 100 blockade runners in business. Charleston was shut down by Admiral John A. Dahlgren's South Atlantic Blockading Squadron in 1863. Mobile Bay was captured in August, 1864, by Admiral David Farragut (tied to the rigging of his flagship, he cried out, "Damn the torpedoes! Full steam ahead!"). Blockade runners faced an increasing risk of capture--in 1861 and 1862, one sortie in 9 ended in capture; in 1863 and 1864, one in 3. By war's end, imports had been choked to a trickle as the risk of capture soared to 50% per sortie. Some 1,100 blockade runners were captured (and another 300 destroyed) in the most effective blockade the world had ever seen. British investors frequently made the mistake of reinvesting their profits in the trade; when the war ended they were stuck with useless ships and rapidly depreciating cotton. In the final accounting, perhaps half the investors took a profit, and half a loss.
In December, 1864, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles sent a force against Fort Fisher, which protected the Confederate's access to the Atlantic from Wilmington, North Carolina, the last open Confederate port. [13]. The first attack failed, but with a change in tactics (and Union generals), the Fort fell in January, 1865, closing the last major Confederate port.
"The Union victory at Vicksburg in July of 1863 opened up the Mississippi River and effectively cut off the western Confederacy as a source of troops and supplies. The fall of Fort Fisher and the city of Wilmington, North Carolina early in 1865 closed the last major port for blockade runners, and in quick succession Richmond was evacuated, the Army of Northern Virginia disintegrated, and General Lee surrendered. Thus, most economists give the Union blockade a prominent role in the outcome of the war." (Elekund, 2004)
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From: Philly (Narberth)
Originally Posted by ralper,Aug 30 2006, 05:41 PM
......Something happened to Lee to make him change his mind and abandon the tactics and strategy that have previously resulted in victory. Lee, for some reason or another, decided to engage the Union Army and to do it head on. Even Longstreet couldn't convince him to reconsider......
Page 106: Lee's thoughts....as he rides towards G-burg in mid-morning:
Now he could hear rifle fire, the small sounds of infantry..... So it was more than a duel of artillery. Yet Heth was not a fool. Heth would have reasons.....
Heth's division....had obviously been repulsed..... What had Heth gotten himself into?.....Lee was thinking: how do we disengage? how do we fall back? where do we hold until Longstreet comes up?
Sir, I moved in this morning as directed. I thought it was only a few militia..... The boys wouldn't hold back. ...Sir, I'm sorry. But it started out as a minor scrap.....next thing I know I'm tangling with half the Union army.
What do you think?
PS: I also (again) support the chaper-by-chapter discussion. Haste makes waste.
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From: Canton, MA
You are all too much. Endosement after endosement for the chapter by chapter method, but everyone is jumping ahead with quotes and conclusions.
Ok, we are at Day 1 the first chapter. Lee.
He is revered. He is a god among his men. But Lee faces his own mortality and it occupies him constantly. He misses Jackson like a lost arm. He doubts the leadership qualities of those he has elevated, Ewell and Early. We see more motive for a quick end to the war.
Lees aides insulate him from what they feel are unnecessary disturbances, but their judgment is clouded by an unrealistic belief in their superiority and prejudice against "non traditional" sources of information and "non-professional soldiers." Stuart has not returned and Lee still has no information about the Union's position. He relies on Longstreet, but we are left to wonder why.
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From: Winchester
I've been lurking for some time and have greatly enjoyed the thread. I'm a southern boy and grew up next to the Chancellorsville battlefield. I actually played in trenches at the rear of my parents property.
I think that Lee is still feeling the devastation of losing Jackson. He was able to depend on Jackson to press any weakness that may be found in the Union deployment - such as the turn of the flank at Chancellorsville. Even though Lee did not want the engagement at Gettysburg possibly he was playing Jackson's accustomed role of the aggressor? Lee also believed that his troops could accomplish any task as long as they were ably led...
I think that Lee is still feeling the devastation of losing Jackson. He was able to depend on Jackson to press any weakness that may be found in the Union deployment - such as the turn of the flank at Chancellorsville. Even though Lee did not want the engagement at Gettysburg possibly he was playing Jackson's accustomed role of the aggressor? Lee also believed that his troops could accomplish any task as long as they were ably led...
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From: Philly (Narberth)
Originally Posted by JWN6264,Aug 31 2006, 01:12 PM
..... Lee also believed that his troops could accomplish any task as long as they were ably led...
Welcome to vintage story time! Congratulations on having the nerve to jump in amongst a serious bunch of KA readers........it's not always easy for a newbie
About your comment: The unfortunate situation for Lee is that his field generals are NOT among his best. Most of the infantry guys are old (vintage) or in ill health.
